


Historic, Archive Document

Do not assume content reflects current scientific knowledge, policies, or practices.

aHD1751
.P64



POLICY RESEARCH NOTES

USDA LIBRARY
NAT'L AGRIC LIBRARY
1997 JUL 11 A 4: 04
CURRENT SERVICE SECTION
ACO/SENIOR/RECORDS

PUBLISHED BY THE NORTH CENTRAL REGIONAL PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH
COMMITTEE AND ECONOMICS, STATISTICS, AND COOPERATIVES SERVICE, USDA

Number 6

July 1978

*For professionals in Public Agricultural and Food Price and Income Policy Research,
Teaching, Extension, Policymaking*

INTRODUCTION

In order to better serve the needs of policy workers to keep current with the rapidly changing arena of public policy, this newsletter is distributed to those included on the *Policy Workers List* and to others with an expressed interest. This improved communication linkage should strengthen and expand policy research, education, and decision-making. Information included originates primarily from voluntary submissions by individuals. Requests for copies of the earlier issues of these *Notes* or for the latest *Policy Workers List*, and comments or suggestions about them, may be sent to either address listed below.

Contents of this issue

Page

Announcements of Policy Activities.....	2
Commentary: "Farm Strike".....	6
News Items.....	17
Available Research Publications.....	22

Policy Research Notes is a cooperative effort of the North Central Regional Public Policy Research Committee and the Agricultural Policy Analysis Program Area, Commodity Economics Division, ESCS. The *Notes* are prepared by R.G.F. Spitze, 305 Mumford Hall, University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois 61801, and Cecil W. Davison, APA,CED,ESCS, 500 12th Street S.W., Washington, D.C. 20250.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

Trade Policy Basebook

In early winter a basebook publication of background papers concerning various aspects of agricultural trade policies will be released from the cooperative project between the Federal and State Extension Services. Chapter titles include: History of U.S. Trade Policy, Theoretical Basis for Trade, International Trade and Domestic Policy, Commodity Agreements, Patterns of Trade, and Current and Emerging Issues. Further information may be obtained from the project leader, Martin Christiansen, Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics, University of Minnesota, St. Paul, Minnesota 55108. For copies of this publication, contact the Federal Extension Service or the State Extension Director and Public Affairs Specialist in the respective states.

National Public Policy Education Conference

The 1978 NPPEC convened at the Burr Oak State Park Lodge, near Athens, Ohio, September 11-15. Sessions stimulated discussion on various facets of food-nutrition policy, energy, small farm policy, international trade, and issues in policy education. The Conference particularly benefited extension workers actively engaged in, or now becoming involved in, public policy education on state and national issues. The Federal and State Extension offices and the Farm Foundation have complete information.

Symposium on Economic Problems of U.S. Agriculture

Texas A&M University and the Agriculture Council of America sponsored a symposium to get agricultural economists, farmers, agribusiness people, and government representatives together in an attempt to reach consensus on the nature of economic problems facing agriculture and what might be done about them. Five task forces covered the following general areas: (1) commodity prices and farm incomes, (2) international trade issues, (3) resource allocation and production costs,

(4) nutrition and food quality issues, and (5) agriculture's role in government decisions. The chairman of each task force was responsible for writing a report reflecting the task force's deliberations. The reports were presented and discussed at a conference on December 4-6, 1978, at Texas A&M. Farmers and agribusiness people, as well as agricultural economists, attended and participated.

The task force chairmen were: (1) Luther Tweeten, Oklahoma State University, (2) Tim Josling, Stanford Food Research Institute, (3) Emery Castle, Resources for the Future, (4) C. Peter Timmer, Harvard School of Public Health, and (5) John Kramer, Georgetown University Law School and special counsel to the House Agriculture Committee. Apart from the chairmen, the majority of task force members were not from the academic community. The task forces were broadly based but did not necessarily represent the different schools of thought among economists.

Participants in each of the task forces approached their subject area with the following questions: What problems for U.S. agriculture exist in this area? What is the nature of the problem? What are the causes? What are the remedies? Which remedy is most likely to solve the problem?

Task force findings were summarized and presented, reviewed by formal discussants, and addressed by informal discussion. The task force reports and conference conclusions will be published as a book by Texas A&M in 1979.

Food Policy Seminar Papers Now Published

Papers presented at a series of ESCS seminars on food policy, held in Washington, D.C. from November 1977 through March 1978 and described in the last issue of *Policy Research Notes*, are now available in the *Agricultural-Food Policy Review*, ESCS-AFPR-2, USDA, September 1978.

For more information contact Thomas A. Stucker, NEAD, ESCS, USDA, Room 260, 500 12th St. S.W., Washington, D.C. 20250. Copies of AFPR-2 are available from ESCS Publications, USDA, Room 0054, South Building, Washington, D.C. 20250.

Policy Studies Journal Speaks on Agricultural Policy

The Summer 1978 Issue of *Policy Studies Journal* (Vol. 6, No. 4), a quarterly publication of the Policy Studies Organization, spawned recently by the American Political Science Association, is devoted entirely to agricultural policy. The series of some nineteen papers built around such topics as Political Change in American Institutions, Issues on the New Agricultural Agenda, and Food and Foreign Policy, were developed partly from a symposium held in 1977 under the leadership of Don Hadwiger, William Browne, and Richard Fraenkel. It also includes an extensive literature review. Copies of this issue of the *Journal* are available from the Policy Studies Organization, 361 Lincoln Hall, University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois 61801 (Price \$2.50).

Conference on Public Policy Related to Small Farms

In early winter 1978-79, a national conference will be held for professional workers from a broad area of expertise and interest to critique position papers being developed around eight policy issues related to the future of the small farm. Small task groups are currently developing these papers under the chairmanships of Paul Barkley, Pat Madden and Del Gardner, Allen Thompson, William Lockeretz, Bob Spitze, Charles Sisson, Dewitt Jones, and Luther Tweeten. Information about final arrangements can be obtained from Pat Madden, Pennsylvania State University, who is coordinating a national Small Farms Project sponsored by the National Rural Center, USDA, and the Farm Foundation.

Regional Project on 1977 Act Before Directors

A North Central Regional Research Project proposal focusing on the "Economic Consequences of Selected Provisions of the Food and Agriculture Act of 1977" was developed by NCT-118 in June, 1978, and has been approved by the North Central Directors. Five phases of the research are envisioned to deal with distributional effects on the public, distribution effects among farm producers, allocative effects, grain reserves, and food stamp program. Participation from interested researchers

throughout the nation will be invited. Further information can be obtained from officers of the temporary drafting committee, Chairman Marshall Martin, Department of Agricultural Economics, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana 47907; Bob Spitze, Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois 61801; and Don Anderson, Department of Agricultural Economics, North Dakota State University, Fargo, North Dakota 58103.

Policy As An Interest in Inter-regional Marketing Project

Governmental policy appears foremost among the objectives to be studied under the five year inter-regional research project NC-139 titled, "Economic Analyses of the United States Grain Exporting Systems." A major evaluation of private versus state trading systems for grain will be attempted, and alternative exporting techniques and strategies will be explored. Policy workers interested in trade policy research from several states are involved. Further information can be obtained from Lowell Hill, Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois 61801; Alex McCalla, Department of Agricultural Economics, University of California, Davis, California 95616; Robert Oehrtman, Department of Agricultural Economics, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma 74074; Larry Martin, School of Agricultural Economics, University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario, Canada; and Lloyd Halvorson, CR, SEA, USDA, Room 6811, South Building, Washington, D.C. 20250.

The Farm Strike

by
Leo V. Mayer*

In Japan a traditional clash between workers and the government has developed into what is known as the "spring offensive". Such a characterization could have been used to describe the American farm scene in 1977-78.

In the fall of 1977, a new farm protest movement, the American Agriculture Movement (AAM) began to form in the Great Plains wheat states. Its initial activity was to call for a national farm strike set for December 14, 1977 to get better farm prices. Although the strike had little impact other than publicity, the AAM, in the following months, organized and claimed among its membership a rather sizable portion of American farmers and ranchers, particularly in drought-affected regions. And while they did not succeed in achieving their goal of 100 percent of parity, the unhappy farmers were responsible for two pieces of farm legislation, the Emergency Agriculture Act of 1978 and the Agricultural Credit Act of 1978, and several Executive actions.

The purpose of this paper is to follow the movement's development from that time to the present and look at its principal actions and actors, its impact, strategies and the underlying reasons for its formation.

Origins and Growth of the Movement

The AAM reportedly started over coffee in rural Campo, Colorado, in mid-1977. Several people claim to have been the originator of the movement. However, most evidence indicates that George and Bud Bitner, brothers, Darrel and Gene Schroeder, a father and son combination, Van Stafford, and Alvin Jenkins were the original participants.

The Bitner brothers, wheat farmers, Darrel Schroeder, a grain farmer and Charolais breeder, his son Gene Schroeder, a veterinarian, farmer and Charolais breeder, and Van Stafford, a local elevator operator and farmer, had frequently discussed the problems of agriculture over coffee. This particular morning they concluded that the situation had progressed to the point where they had to do something. They had just read about the newly enacted farm program and felt that no one in Washington had consulted the farmers.

At coffee in Campo the morning of September 6, when the decision was made to do something, the consensus was to organize a group to carry out a farm strike. The first meeting took place in nearby Springfield in the basement of a bank. Approximately 40 people showed up at the meeting and there was general agreement to call for a nationwide farm strike during which no farm products would be sold until a law was passed mandating 100% of parity prices for all farm products.¹

*This paper reflects a wide range of input from knowledgeable persons who made this paper possible and to whom the writer expresses his sincere appreciation. The writer is Senior Specialist for Agriculture at the Library of Congress.

The next step was a general meeting held in Springfield the next week. Darrel Schroeder made up flyers which were widely circulated in the adjacent farming areas. An estimated crowd of 700 people showed up for the meeting, coming from 4 different states. This group voted to call for a nationwide farm strike. The date was set for December 14, a date when all crops were expected to have been harvested nationwide. Within a few days, they had opened an office in Springfield.

The leaders at this point stressed that they were not starting a new farm organization but rather a movement. This continued to be their position. There were no officers, dues, structure or bylaws. Anyone who chose to be was a spokesman for the group.

Thus Baca County, Colorado and its largest town and county seat Springfield, were put on the map as the headquarters of a national farm strike. Springfield, located about 20 miles from Campo, with a population of 1,660 and an elevation of 4,400 feet, was an unusual place to be headquarters for a national farm movement. The population of the whole county was only 5,674. The county borders New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Kansas, is approximately 40 miles from the Texas border and is some 20 percent larger than the state of Delaware. Farming is risky business there. The common rule of thumb is 3 good crops out of 10 crop years, 3 failures, 2 fair crops and 2 poor crops. There is some irrigation, but it is deep-well and expensive. The area also has periodic problems with wind and hail.

Vice President Mondale met with a group of the farmers in mid-November in Pueblo, Colorado where the AAM held its first really big tractorcade. And while he did not promise them anything, he did not take a hard line with the group. Many of the participants were encouraged by the Mondale meeting. It received wide media coverage and was very helpful from an organizing standpoint, since Mondale's presence tended to legitimize the Movement.

While most of the early organizing was centered in the West, the South was also tapped. Drought had severely hurt many farmers in the South, particularly in Georgia. Georgia was quickly organized and became one of the most outspoken of the Southern delegations. Thanksgiving weekend, the movement sponsored a tractorcade in Plains, Georgia, demanding a meeting with President Carter and publicizing their grievances. The event drew a large attendance. President Carter did not attend the rally, but it was a definite media success with farmers from several states participating.

After the Plains, Georgia, demonstration and the evidence that President Carter wasn't willing to accede to their demands, strong pressure was applied to Senator Herman Talmadge, Chairman of the Senate Agriculture Committee and Congressman Thomas Foley, Chairman of the House Agriculture Committee. In addition to the generally low prices in agriculture, the administrators of the new farm program were having their troubles

¹The idea of withholding agricultural products from the marketplace until a higher price can be obtained has always carried great appeal in farm communities. Various movements have sought to exploit this idea. The "Farmer's Holiday Movement" of 1932, seems to have the greatest similarity to the AAM. Both used the slogan of plant nothing, sell nothing. Both called a strike, both engaged in a publicity campaign to educate the public on agriculture's problems and in neither movement achieved their stated goals in the market, although the government ultimately provided some relief in both cases. There was one very notable difference: the Holiday Movement had considerably more violence associated with it. For a historical perspective on farm strikes, see USDA background paper 3666-7 from the Office of Governmental and Public Affairs.

getting the program operating. This caused particular problems in Foley's district of Washington State, an area that grows a great deal of wheat and barley. The State ASCS office failed to get the wheat deficiency payments out on time and the barley payment was held up waiting for President Carter to set the new barley target price mandated in the 1977 farm bill. These became rallying points for disgruntled farmers in Eastern Washington.

In order to find out what the problems were and get things moving, the House Livestock and Grains Subcommittee under the chairmanship of W. R. Poage of Texas, held a field hearing in Pullman, Washington on December 10, 1977. The hearing became a focal point for the infant AAM in the states of Washington and Idaho. The meeting received rather widespread attention in the far west, but the attempt of some of the AAM activists to embarrass committee members was not particularly successful. In fact, some of the activists actually boycotted the meeting because it was set up according to standard format for Committee field hearings and not the manner they preferred.

By the first of December, the movement claimed 34 strike offices in 17 states, with the sympathy of 500,000 farmers. To keep their interest and involvement, rallies and tractorcades were being held in most state capitals. One of these tractorcades in Minnesota was held in 20 degree below zero weather, with Congressman Richard Nolan on the lead tractor. Other tractorcades were in conjunction with visits to an area by Secretary Bergland or other governmental officials.

On December 12, two days before the strike was to begin, a national meeting was convened with representatives from over 40 states in attendance in Denver. The meeting was, according to participants, an unorganized affair in which the rules were changed as it progressed. For the first 12 hours, from noon until midnight, the group of several hundred people listened to reports from each of the states. Everyone had come looking for direction, but instead heard state report after state report, detailing every problem with every commodity in every state. After 12 hours, the meeting took a short recess for each state to elect a spokesman, which, from this point on, were known as delegates. The delegates then met from midnight until 4 a.m. trying to establish some direction. Delegates took turns conducting the meeting, whoever could talk the loudest conducting the meeting.

It was the first of the delegate meetings that were later to occur every night in Washington from mid January until April 13 and illustrated the commitment to remain a movement rather than become a formal organization.

The rest of December and January were spent building support and organizing local groups, generally on a county basis. The efforts brought remarkable results. For instance, the first meeting in Tennessee was in Dyersburg, in early December. By the first of January, 13 county groups were organized, mostly in the row crop areas of West Tennessee.

The strike was put into action on December 14. Large numbers of farmers parked their equipment on the sides of roads with signs saying "on strike". The impact on the markets was negligible. There were a few attempts at disruption of local markets, but generally the strike was a verbal war aimed at government. The movement had by this time, begun to attract rather wide support and sympathy, although the real extent of that support was the subject of some controversy.

On January 6, Nebraska Governor Exon, acting as a chairman of a group of 10 midwestern agricultural governors, convened a meeting in Omaha and invited the governor of every state to send a delegation to meet with the Secretary of Agriculture. Some delegations represented the AAM while others represented traditional organizations and still others simply represented their governor.

The meeting was described by both participants and observers as a fiasco. As much as half of Secretary Bergland's time was spent observing a heated debate between participants over who would get to talk to him and who wouldn't. AAM members objected to the participation of non-AAM representatives and spent most of their allotted time telling him how bad everything was without really making any suggestions or asking Bergland what he was willing to do.

The first Washington, D. C. farmer offensive began on January 15, and continued through January 20. It included a tractorcade, speeches and meetings, but was basically an unorganized assault on Congress, USDA, and the White House. Delegations of strikers wandered from Congressional office to Congressional office, in no particular order, but concentrating strongly on Agriculture Committee members. Few of them had their efforts well organized or well directed at achieving their goals.

Most were still trying to attract attention for the movement. This brought about some spectacular publicity gimmicks such as the release of goats on the Capitol steps. One group of farmers asked for a meeting with the West German Agricultural Attache with the mistaken impression that he could and would arrange for purchases of U.S. wheat at 100 percent of parity. When it became apparent that such an arrangement was not to be, one of the members of the group scattered a bushel of wheat they had used as a display and tried to physically assault the attache. In another widely reported incident, a large group of farmers stormed USDA breaking down a door and remaining in a portion of the building demanding a meeting with Secretary Bergland for nearly 24 hours.

Legislative Action of the Movement

In mid January Secretary Bergland met with the AAM delegates in the crowded hearing room of the House Agriculture Committee. He was generally treated with respect, but the AAM representatives were clearly not happy with his answers, even though he took a rather soft line and possibly even encouraged them when he told them they had every right to strike. This support along with the support of several well respected agriculturally oriented Congressional members for the strikers' demands tended to help the Movement gain momentum. Few Congressmen or their aides were willing to voice outright opposition to the demands of the AAM. Many of the farmers misinterpreted the comments and sympathy that members of Congress expressed for their plight as being a specific commitment to support their position.

After a week of the protest activities, the House Agriculture Committee agreed to schedule hearings on the "Current Agricultural Situation" to provide the AAM and other agricultural interests an organized forum to present their story and Committee members a chance to decide whether action on their part was necessary.

On the Senate side Senator Talmadge, Chairman of the Senate Agriculture Committee called upon the Administration to take five actions within the administrative jurisdiction of the Secretary that could ease their economic burden and defuse the farm strike. These were: A land diversion program including payments to bring production into line with demand, an increase in the loan value for wheat to \$2.75, an increase in the loan value for corn to \$2.50, an increase in the loan value for soybeans to \$5.00, and establishment of the loan for "additional" peanuts at \$420 a ton.

Secretary of Agriculture Bergland appeared before the Senate Committee on Agriculture on January 24, and was asked whether the Department planned to implement these proposals. The Secretary said no, just as the Department said no to the

various proposals of the American Agricultural Movement.

There followed another thirteen days of hearings by the Senate Agriculture Committee on the State of American Agriculture. The overpowering presence of the farmers significantly influenced these hearings and the directions of the legislative proposals. In the beginning a good share of the members of the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry took cautious positions on the AAM proposals and called upon the Administration to take initiatives to resolve the problems.

The Administration ignored these requests. As a result the Senate began looking for a solution that would get the farmers out of Washington. Senator Talmadge pledged that if the Administration did not enact his proposals he would bring them forth as a legislative proposal. Several other legislative proposals were introduced, including Senator Dole's bill on flexible parity and bills by Senator McGovern and Senator Clark that would significantly increase loan and target levels for most program commodities.

The hearings on the House side began on February 1 with Secretary Bergland as the leadoff witness. The Secretary, as a former colleague of the Committee members, was both well respected and well liked. However, during this hearing he received some of his toughest treatment from his former colleagues since becoming Secretary. Bergland himself took a tough stand in support of leaving the 1977 Act alone and allowing it to work. The overflow crowd in the hearing room and the adjacent hallways were not happy with his answers. Bergland, during this time period, received several threats on his life and had to observe rather strict security precautions.

Between February 1, and February 16, the House Committee heard from over 300 witnesses and compiled a record of 1,182 pages of statements and questions and answers. Most of the statements were made by the AAM representatives or their sympathizers. Many of the statements were repetitive, generally depicting the plight of the farmer and asking in some form or another for much higher government price guarantees for farmers. There were a few notable exceptions where witnesses suggested keeping the 1977 Act and giving the markets a chance to work things out. The traditional farm organizations generally maintained a low profile. Some of them were, in fact, viewed by the AAM as part of the problem -- particularly the American Farm Bureau Federation.

After the hearings, House Agriculture Committee Members were in a quandry over how or whether to proceed with legislation. Republican members were convinced that they had missed out in 1977 by not offering their own proposal that would have allowed Republican members to vote against the farm bill, but still show support for farmers. To overcome this missed opportunity, Minority Leader Rhodes appointed Representative Henson Moore of Louisiana Chairman of an Agricultural Task Force. After some deliberation, the Task Force recommended their legislative proposal which embodied most of Senator Dole's "flexibility parity" proposal.

Democratic members also were actively seeking some remedy. They, however, found much less basis for agreement than had the Republicans. Many felt much closer to the Administration, and much more restrained by the realities of what could and could not be passed.

On the other hand, several of the members were under such intense pressure from their farm constituencies that they were willing to support any legislative proposals which raised farm support levels regardless of how unrealistic and unlikely their enactment. Many committee members expressed the concern that any Committee action would turn into a bidding process where the Members sought to outbid each other in proving how much they were willing to do for their farm constituencies. Such action in all likelihood would have led to rejection of the legislation by the House as a whole.

While this discussion was going on, House members of both parties were urging Administrative action and were waiting to see if there would be any. Finally, in late March, Chairman Thomas Foley of the Agriculture Committee introduced a bill to provide for modest increases in both the target prices and loans for the major commodities. The Administration did not respond on whether or not the legislation was acceptable. Many of the members were not willing to publicly support the legislation and face the wrath of the AAM without some assurance from the Administration (which never came) that the bill would be signed if passed.

Senator Talmadge finally solved this dilemma when he made good on his promise to report legislation unless the Administration acted. His action came when the Senate Agriculture Committee reported a House-passed bill (H.R. 6782) that modified a raisin marketing order and attached to it a new farm bill as an amendment. Because the bill had already passed the House, it was possible to go directly to conference with the Senate without House consideration of the farm program itself.

The Senate-passed bill lumped three different proposals together: a supply control/land diversion program, an increase in target prices and loans, and "flexible parity." Chairman Foley urged the adoption of the increased target prices and loans but was never able to get the sufficient votes to carry his position among House conferees. This came as a surprise to many, if not most, observers, but was an indication of the tremendous pressure which the conferees were under. When Representative Sebelius offered his proposal for a modified version of "flexible parity" it then passed.

The Conference Report then had to be accepted, first by the House and then by the Senate. Under normal circumstances, a Conference Report is subject to a simple up or down vote. However, this legislation was in violation of House Budget rules. To get around the problem, Chairman Foley requested and was granted a waiver from the Rules Committee. He also requested to be allowed to offer the position he had offered in conference if the Conference Report failed to pass. AAM members lobbied hard against this provision and were successful in their efforts to prevent this waiver.

Most observers expected the vote on the House floor to be very close. Republican support for the proposal was expected to be very strong because it was sanctioned by the Republican leadership and the Republican Task Force, and because it would force the President to veto a bill which would help farm state Republicans. Farm state Democrats and their sympathizers were expected to bring enough additional support to either pass the Conference Report or be very close. When the Conference Report failed by a 2-to-1 vote, most of the AAM group in Washington and many of the other observers were genuinely shocked. And because of the earlier action of the Rules Committee it was not possible to offer any compromise.

Given the events of the 30 days previous to the vote, there probably should not have been surprise at the outcome. Food price inflation suddenly had become a major issue. The Administration had used it rather effectively as an argument against the AAM proposals. The Administration also had taken steps to ease the agricultural crunch and make farm programs more attractive. Farm prices had risen in the interim. The strikers themselves had created resentment among many of the members with their pressure tactics and what many of the members considered coercion. Not nearly as many Republican members were willing to go along as had been expected. In fact, two of the most respected farm state Republicans, both Agricultural Committee Members, had helped lead the fight against the proposal. And, finally, many of the people who would lose as a result of the legislation--livestock producers, consumer groups, and others--made their opposition known.

The conference did meet again several days later and adopted a new compromise. This compromise simply gave the Administration the flexibility to adjust target prices

anytime a set-aside was in effect. This flexibility had been sought by the Administration and the bill was signed by President Carter after being approved by both the House and the Senate.

One often-expressed comment during this period was surprise at the number of participants that took part in the Washington protest. The surprise came because it was unclear how such a large group of farmers could be away from their farming operations for such extended periods. In reality, it was quite easily explained. It was wintertime when farmers, particularly row crop farmers, repair equipment, attend sales, trade equipment, do all those other things that are put off during the crop season, and maybe even take a vacation, if they can afford it. In the winter of 1977/78, these normal activities were for many farmers replaced by strike meetings, tractorcades, and trips to Washington to lobby for higher farm prices.

Demands of the Movement

The "demands" of the AAM were on the surface very simple--100 percent of parity. The general AAM usage of 100 percent of parity was explained in an interview with AAM leaders from Springfield, Colorado by Joan McNeal in *World of Agricultural Aviation* (November 1977, pages 16-19, 45-46 and 55). McNeal's question was "What do you mean by parity?"

The answer: "Our description of parity very simply is that the farmers must have the cost of production plus a fair return on investment and labor. It is the proper relationship between what we buy and what we sell. There are other people throughout our economy that get 100 percent of parity. That is why we feel we have to have 100 percent of parity..."

Most of the original statements or demands were that prices be set by law at 100 percent of parity (when asked about specific numbers, USDA's latest parity figures were generally quoted). Most of the literature spelled out five demands. These seem to have been drafted by the Colorado group.

- "1. 100 percent of parity for all domestically used or consumed agricultural products.
2. 100 percent of parity for all foreign exports of agricultural products.
3. Contracting of all agricultural products produced for national and international food reserves by any or all governments at 100 percent of parity.
4. Creation of amenity or structure, with inputs from farmers, to handle marketing of American agricultural products at 100 percent of parity.
5. Stopping meat and livestock imports until parity prices are reached."²

²An undated AAM flyer. For a complete description, see "Evaluation of Proposals Guaranteeing Full Parity for Farmers in the Marketplace". Committee Print, Committee on Agriculture, U.S. House of Representatives, 95th Congress, 2nd session, Washington: 1978.

These five points were later expanded to become either an 8 or 12 point plan. The plans did not produce any immediate results, government or otherwise, but they did get national media coverage and provided support for an organization which helped to further organize unhappy farmers. The Movement was to some extent legitimized and popularized by the recognition it received in the national press, particularly T.V. news.

By the time the 8 and 12 point plans had been presented, a system of marketing quotas was included to handle oversupply problems. The later proposals also called for direction of farm programs by a producer board which would have made many, if not most of the policy decisions previously made by the Secretary of Agriculture. Some plans even envisioned computerizing everything so that each farmer could check with the county office where a computer would tell him what he could or could not plant. Some of the initial statements also mentioned announcing farm programs early enough that all farmers and ranchers could take advantage of them the first year they were in effect. Others demanded that all food stamp and related programs be removed from USDA.

By early January, different positions began to appear in the Movement. Many of the southern delegates, other than the Georgia group, and some of the midwesterners and westerns seemed uneasy with the call for 100 percent of parity and concluded that a lesser goal might be more attainable. They at one time or another embraced one or both of two different suggestions. The first, a high loan program was proposed in an editorial in the Delta Farm Press, a widely respected farm paper in the South. They suggested returning to essentially the commodity programs of the 1950's and 1960's. The second, generally known as the Arkansas plan, based everything on cost of production. At one time, 12 or 13 of the state delegations evidently supported the "cost of production" concept, but they were always outvoted in the delegate meetings. While these positions, particularly the latter drew wide support, they never supplanted the 100 percent of parity as a goal for the AAM.

The 100 percent of parity concept was not without support even in Congress. The Senate passed legislation that would have provided target prices equal to 100 percent of parity through a "flexible parity" plan. On a complicated procedure the House agreed to go directly to Conference on the Senate passed bill. The Conference then agreed to the "flexible parity" approach but it was rejected when brought to the vote before the full House of Representatives.

Following that defeat a group of AAM members who favored cost-of-production as a basis for farm programs made a strong push for the AAM to adopt a cost-of-production goal for legislation. This measure came to a delegate vote in a meeting in Oklahoma City in April, but was turned down by a substantial margin making it clear that the AAM would not endorse a cost-of-production concept. Many of the plan's supporters then withdrew their active support for the AAM and directed their energies through channels other than the AAM, weakening the Movement in the process.

Causes Underlying the AAM

What precipitated the AAM? Why were farmers who are generally considered to be very conservative and opposed to government controls as a group, willing to endorse a proposal that would have required massive government intervention in agricultural production? Who were those farmers who showed up in Washington wearing unusual banners and driving tractors?

There are no simple answers to the above questions. One seemingly obvious answer is that prices were low and many areas had experienced poor crops. However, low prices and poor crops alone do not adequately explain the formation of such a group, particularly in such a short period of time. The AAM appears to have resulted from sociological factors almost as much as economic factors. The impact of the low prices and natural disasters were critical to the Movement's being, but were only catalysts.

Several issues played key roles. Timing was one of these -- low prices followed a period of unusual prosperity for most farmers. Another was the increase in production costs during a low price period. Farm prices had fallen before, but seldom, if ever, have prices fallen so precipitously while production costs rose so rapidly. Farmers faced deflation of their product prices and inflation of their input prices, and they were unable to affect either.

Another factor was the prevalent mistrust of the system and institutions that has built up in the agricultural community. The original organizers of the AAM had read press accounts about the enactment of the Food and Agriculture Act of 1977 and were convinced that no one in Washington had consulted with farmers. Many of the farmers involved were convinced that there was a conspiracy between the government, USDA in particular, and big business and big labor to keep prices to farmers low. Most farmers were convinced that they have been unfairly made the scapegoat for higher food prices when a larger part of the increase had come from the marketing process. Noticeable indication of this mistrust could be seen from the increasing percentage of farmers who in the last few years had refused to cooperate with the Statistical Reporting Service in making crop and livestock estimates. That percentage had climbed rather drastically.

In addition to the mistrust of government and its bureaucracies in general, farmers generally exhibited outright resentment toward the actions of OSHA and EPA in particular and to some extent FDA and other regulatory agencies. This was not surprising. The actions of these agencies had a major impact on agriculture, but their personnel had little or no connection with agriculture and often didn't realize the full impact on farmers of their decisions.

Implementation of a new farm program, after three years of no programs, added to the frustration. The new program was late being signed into law and even later getting out into the country. The apprehensions and misunderstandings that accompanied the new law added to an already bad situation.

And to the above add the inherent problem brought on by that feeling of helplessness producers get from being residual agricultural product suppliers, particularly in grains, to the rest of the world. Most of the world markets are generally very protectionist, and most other countries have a market system more structured and less open than the U.S. This adds to the "boom and bust" tendencies of U.S. markets that are reasonably open with free access for other countries. During the "bust" periods, producers become very frustrated, partly because of the feeling that they have no control over their own destiny. It was out of this feeling of frustration that the AAM was born.

Profile of a Farmstriker

Harold Breimyer in a January, 1978 letter, provided an apt description of those involved in the AAM. "My interpretation of the American Agriculture Movement is that it combines a couple of sharply different types. One is the guys who were about to leverage themselves into still more expansion, find themselves stymied, and are

resentful; and a new generation of young farmers who took at face value the conventional wisdom of the mid 1970's that agriculture would be prosperous and there would be a place in it for them. They are in desperate circumstances and will join any protest movement that comes down the pike... Most of us appreciate the very wide difference in the financial position between the older and younger farmers. Let me add that the phenomenon itself is not new; the unique feature was the exceptionally large bulge in the farmer's income at the mid 1970's."

Other analysts of the participants in the strike made prominent mention of renters. They, unlike even the new entrants into agriculture, who bought land, have no land equity at all to fall back on. Most landowners could at least sell out and realize a gain. Renters, on the other hand, simply have to absorb their losses. They were noticeably evident among the AAM's participants and were some of the most desperate of those involved. These renters point out the peculiar problems arising from absentee landownership which seems to be an increasing trend in most areas, particularly in areas where the AAM support was the strongest.

Impacts of the Movement

Some of the impacts of the AAM are readily apparent. The Movement was successful in creating a national awareness of a farm problem. In addition, the AAM was able to get some relief, both administrative and legislative. The Administrative actions were taken to meet what was seen as a genuine need as well as to forestall legislative action.

The major items included a paid diversion program for cotton and feed grains, actions to make the grain reserve program more attractive and a moratorium on virtually all FmHA foreclosures. The administrative actions were taken in the spring of 1978 and were in addition to earlier actions which the Administration had taken in an attempt to strengthen farm income.

The Department of Agriculture published a list of "Twenty-five Major Government Actions to Strengthen Farm Income Taken Since January 20, 1977" in January of 1978. These included some of the actions taken in late 1977 and early 1978 in response to the growing perception that farmers were having serious problems. None were as important as the actions taken later in the Spring of 1978.

The legislative action included Emergency Agricultural legislation that provided the Secretary of Agriculture with the opportunity to adjust target prices any time a set-aside is in effect. The Secretary used this authority to raise the wheat target price by 40¢ per bushel. Credit legislation provided a refinancing package for farmers with serious credit problems.

The striking farmers did not succeed in getting a law passed which mandated 100 percent of parity market prices. They did, however, come much closer than most people had anticipated when the Senate passed the AAM supported "Flexible parity" legislation that would have provided 100 percent of parity for farmers who set-aside as much as 50 percent of their planted acres.

The Movement had impacts beyond the Administrative and legislative actions. Probably the most important was the education that large numbers of the farmers involved, particularly young ones, received on how the agricultural legislative and administrative processes work. It was gained through contact with USDA, Congressmen, Senators and State officials. Many of these farmers, particularly the young ones, will be involved in leadership roles in the farm community for many years to come.

Not all of the Movement's impact has been positive for the farmer. The large numbers of farmers who came to Washington had for a limited time a positive impact, because their efforts showed dramatically that there were a large number of unhappy farmers. They quickly informed everyone in Washington of their plight. However, after the initial impact, their presence became more and more negative as their presentation quickly evolved into a rote expression given by countless delegations which went to the same places. Senators, Congressman and Administration officials soon tired of this type of action. There was also some minor violence and threats of violence. While only a few individuals were involved, this was highly detrimental to the farm cause. And the massive presence itself was self defeating in that many Congressmen and Senators resented the attempt to force passage of legislation by sheer force of numbers.

The Movement raised some serious agricultural policy questions. In particular: Are agricultural producers committed to the present type of farm program that maintains the exportability of commodities through lower loan prices and direct payments for income support?

The support for the AAM also raises questions about commodity groups and other farm organizations. How strong do their members support the positions they take? Has the success of the AAM forced some of these positions to change? And did the success of the AAM decrease the effectiveness of other farm organizations?

The Movement also illustrated policy weaknesses: In particular, a need for policy instruments that can be directed at specific problems or geographic areas which suffer unusual economic hardships not of their own making.

Future

Most knowledgeable observers had predicted that the AAM could never successfully organize and when it did that it would die an early death. The Movement is now a year old and while the fervor and activity has died down, a well established communication network between the strikers is operating smoothly. The Movement now seems to be going through the period of sorting out leadership that most new organizations experience.

The deciding factor determining whether the AAM will continue or fade into the landscape will be the price and cost situations. If prices continue to improve beyond the increases already experienced, or costs begin to stabilize, then we can expect the group to fade. On the other hand, if prices were to decline to the level of 1977 or lower, or costs continue to increase rapidly, the AAM may well become a formal organization that will play a significant role in agriculture policy of the future.

POLICY RESEARCH NEWS ITEMS

(projects and activities as submitted)

The Role of Agricultural Trade

A team effort produced a packet of four pamphlets for distribution to the general public. They describe the role of agricultural trade, the shift from aid to trade, and issues of protectionism vs. free trade. A fifth publication reports on the results of an intensive TV and radio campaign in the Saginaw Valley of Michigan to improve understanding of agricultural trade.

Inquire from John Ferris, Department of Agricultural Economics, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan 48824, and request a copy of the pamphlets under the title, "World Agricultural Trade--Food, America's Essential Resource."

Nontariff Agricultural Trade Barriers

Research on nontariff agricultural trade barriers has been completed at the University of Arizona and is being published in book form by the University of Nebraska Press.

Inquire about research from Jimmie S. Hillman, Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona 85721.

Order book by above title from the University of Nebraska Press, 901 North 17th Street, Lincoln, Nebraska 68588 (price \$13.50).

An Analysis of the UNCTAD Integrated Program for Commodities

This study estimates the capital requirements needed to stabilize price and export earnings around the 1961-75 trends of several commodities produced primarily by developing countries.

Inquire from John W. Murray, NEAD, ESCS, USDA, Room 245, 500 12th Street S.W., Washington, D.C. 20250, and request Foreign Agriculture Economic Report No. 148, by above title, authored by Murray and L. Jay Atkinson.

Disaster Assistance for Farmers: Current Programs and 1978 Policy Issues

This comprehensive study is intended to provide a primer on federal disaster assistance for farmers in order to initiate an exchange of views and a broad public discussion of the policy issues faced in the development of new legislation. Included is a descriptive and evaluative discussion of farm disaster assistance programs, an in-depth analysis of specific programs and authorities, an assessment focusing on management and budgetary issues, and descriptive appendices.

Inquire about this effort from A. Barry Carr, Food and Agriculture Section, ENR, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 20540.

Request committee print by above title from Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, 231 Russell Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C. 20510.

Farm Policy and Research on Risk Management

Analyses were made concerning the implications of farm price and income support programs for risks which farmers face, the techniques used by farmers for risk

management; and the demand for research on risk management.

Inquire about this work from Bruce Gardner, Department of Agricultural Economics, Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas 77843, and request paper with above title by Peter Barry.

Economic Impact of Farm Size Alternatives on Rural Communities

This study demonstrates the impact of farm size structure on income, output, and employment in an Idaho community. Replacing small farms with large farms results in greater community income, while increasing the number of small farms results in greater employment with agricultural output similar for the two cases.

Inquire about study from Gerald Marousek, Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Idaho, Moscow, Idaho 83843, and request copy of Experiment Station Bulletin #582 by above title, May 1978, from Mail Room, Agriculture Experiment Station, University of Idaho, Moscow, Idaho 83843 (price, 25 cents).

Small Farms Policy and Research Agenda project

The purpose of this project is to develop a series of State-of-the-Arts review papers (50-100 pp. each) on the following topics related to the viability of small to moderate-scale family farms: societal values and goals, marketing, production, off-farm income, structural change, energy, taxes, and governmental policies.

Inquire from Project Leader J. Patrick Madden, Department of Agricultural Economics, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, Pennsylvania 16801.

Request initial reports related to above project entitled "Report on NRC Winrock Conference," October 1977, and "Report on Meeting of Issue Groups, Saint Louis, Missouri, June 1978, from Barbara Kincaid, National Rural Center, 1828 L Street N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

AGRIMOD: A Dynamic Simulation Model of the U.S. Food Production System

AGRIMOD a dynamic simulation model of the U.S. food production system is designed for policy analysis. Publications on two parts are available. The crop production model consists of 17 submodels fully integrated through material and information flows into four sectors (pre-production, farm input, market, and crop production) and three markets for the period 1955-1990. Submodels include (1) regional land development and use, (2) the crop producer's resource allocation problem, (3) expected prices, (4) fertilizer demand, (5) farm input market, and (6) realized crop production.

Documentation of the model accompanies the simulation of the historical period 1956-1974. A baseline scenario for the period 1975-1990 includes two variants, energy prices and weather. Simulation results are analyzed to demonstrate the model's capabilities as an aid to policy analysis.

Inquire about the project from Alexander H. Levis, Mgr., Policy Analysis Program, Systems Control, Inc., 1801 Page Mill Road, Palo Alto, California 94304.

Request the two publications, *Part I: Crop Production*, and *Part III: Model Validation and Use*, authored by A. H. Levis, Elizabeth Ducot, and Ilze S. Levis, either from NTIS or from Systems Control at the above address (price \$9.25 each).

National Food Review

Food policy research and news are included in this quarterly summary of the national food situation and outlook. The publication also contains articles

relating to marketing, consumer research, and legislative and executive action.

For information contact William T. Boehm, NEAD, ESCS, USDA, Room 260, 500 12th Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20250. Copies of the *National Food Review* are available from ESCS Publications, Room 0054, South Building, Washington, D.C. 20250.

The Food Stamp Program and its Impact on the Price of Food

The impact of food stamp bonus issuance on the Consumer Price Indexes for all food, meats, cereal and bakery products, and dairy products was isolated in an OLS framework. Bonus issuance was found to have a statistically significant but very small impact on each of these indexes.

For more information on this project contact Mike Belongia, NEAD, ESCS, USDA, Room 260, 500 12th Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20250, and request a copy of the article by the above title which will appear in *Agricultural Economics Research*, Vol. 31, January 1979.

Food Stamp Redemptions: Forecasting the Government's Liability

This report answers 3 questions: (1) What has been the extent of coupon loss or non-use over the history of the Food Stamp Program? (2) What is the lag structure involved in the coupon redemption process? (3) How does the coupon redemption process work? Statistical models were derived and estimated to represent and forecast stamp issuance, redemptions, and the Government payment liability.

For more information and a copy of the report by the above title, contact Mike Belongia, NEAD, ESCS, USDA, Room 260, 500 12th Street S.W., Washington, D.C. 20250.

Policy Issues in Preserving Prime Farmland

The cost of preserving prime farmland is being explored by an analysis of costs of development on nearby less-suitable land. Case situations are being developed in Mason County, West Virginia. Various economic and engineering techniques are used in the analysis.

Inquire from Dale Colyer, 2020 Agricultural Sciences Building, West Virginia University, Morgantown, West Virginia 26506.

Federal Estate Taxes and Agricultural Land Transfer

This study covered 183 estates containing farmland in two Illinois counties from 1974 through 1976. A report in preparation will show the size of the gross estate, net estate, taxable estate, claims against the estate, liquid assets to meet tax obligations, amount of taxes paid, disposition of farmland, and various inter-relationships.

Inquire about this project and request related publication, "Estate Taxes and Land Transfers," from Harold D. Guither, 305 Mumford Hall, Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois 61801.

Alternative Policies for Controlling Nonpoint Agricultural Sources of Water Pollution

This reports the results of a two-year interdisciplinary study combining social, economic, and environmental concerns, under the leadership of W. D. Seitz, and a team at the University of Illinois including R. G. F. Spitze, E. R. Swanson,

C. R. Taylor, and others. It analyzes the evolution of relevant institutional arrangements, an estimate of the cost for alternative institutions relevant to this environmental problem, survey results of social acceptance among clientele groups, economic impacts of alternative erosion control policies at the water shed and governmental levels, and legal considerations.

Request final report by above title and identified as EPA-600/5-78-005, April 1978, 314 pp., from National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. (There may be a charge.)

Policy Analysis of Grain Alcohol as a Fuel Source

An evaluation of grain alcohol in motor fuels refutes the principal claims of supporters of a gasohol program, as summarized by the Nebraska Agricultural Products Industrial Utilization Committee. The study suggests that the failure of the gasohol production process to achieve favorable thermal and economic efficiencies dims hopes by some people that a regional or national gasohol program will raise grain prices and provide a renewable source of energy.

Inquire from James G. Kendrick, 330 Filley Hall, University of Nebraska, Lincoln, Nebraska 68583, and request a report entitled "Grain Alcohol in Motor Fuels: An Evaluation," authored by Kendrick and Pamela J. Murray.

Energy Policies: Price Impacts on the U. S. Food System

This study, from which a report by the above title will soon be published, analyzes the National Energy Bill which was submitted in May 1977 and its impact on the agricultural sector. The analysis considers impacts on farms, food processing, farm inputs, consumers, rural residents, and regions.

Inquire about this project and request report by the above title authored by R. Thomas Van Arsdall and Patricia J. Devlin from the latter author, NEAD, ESCS, USDA, Room 120, 500 12th Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20250.

Effect of the Dairy Support Program on Parity Prices

This review explores the hypothesis that one effect of the dairy price support program is to raise the level at which the price of manufacturing milk must be supported in order to maintain a fixed relationship to parity. The use of moving averages in current parity computations makes it possible for the price support to raise both the parity price of all milk and the parity equivalent price of manufacturing milk.

Inquire about this review and request a copy of the paper by above title from W. E. Hamilton, American Farm Bureau Federation, 225 Touhy Avenue, Park Ridge, Illinois 60068.

Dairy Price Policy: Setting, Problems, Alternatives

This investigation deals primarily with the problem of supporting milk prices and alternatives available in pursuit of that objective. It considers a number of major policy issues in connection with the milk marketing order program and marketing cooperative policies. An extensive research program on these problems and effects of alternative approaches will be required to delineate the policy choices.

Inquire from Alden C. Manchester, ESCS, USDA, Room 448, 500 12th Street S.W., Washington, D.C. 20250, and request bulletin by above title from ESCS Publications, 0054 South Building, USDA, Washington, D.C. 20250.

Tobacco Programs: Consequences of Their Elimination and Alternatives

This study focuses on tobacco marketing quotas, their allocation to farms on a historic basis, tobacco price supports, and CCC funding of nonrecourse loans. The effects on size and distribution of income among producers from abolishing or significantly changing these programs are examined. Alternative policies are noted. Contradictions between abolishing the supply-control aspects and responding to the smoking-health issues are described.

Request copy of study from Charles R. Pugh, Extension Economist, 3136 D. H. Hill Library, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, North Carolina 27650.

Soviet Agricultural Policy

This effort involved a survey of Soviet agricultural policies from the formation of the USSR through the current five-year plan.

Inquire from David M. Schoonover, FAS, 5506 South Building, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washington, D.C. 20250 and request related articles, "Soviet Agricultural Policies from Development to Maturity", *Soviet Union*, Vol. 4, Part 2, 1977, published by Arizona State University, 120B McAllister, Tempe, Arizona 85281.

Virgin Islands Agricultural Policy Analysis

An interdisciplinary team of agricultural specialists recently worked in the Virgin Islands analyzing the potential for its agricultural development. Studies were made of water, land ownership, small farms, taxes, and agricultural policies. The development of a grain crop appeared to offer the greatest potential.

Inquire about the above work, particularly concerning agricultural policies, from Verne W. House, Department of Economics, Montana State University, Bozeman, Montana 59717.

POLICY RESEARCH PUBLICATIONS AVAILABLE

(list as submitted)

BREIMYER, HAROLD F. "Agriculture and Nutrition: A Policy Perspective." University of Missouri, Department of Agricultural Economics, Paper 1978-4, and "The Nature of the U.S. Economy: An Essay on Parameters and Preconceptions." University of Missouri, Department of Agricultural Economics, Paper 1978-13 (for National Planning Association).

Request from author, Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri 65211.

BREIMYER, HAROLD F. "Farm Policy 1978: Recycled Old or Innovative New?" University of Missouri, Department of Agricultural Economics Paper 1978-5 (Oklahoma State University Visiting Scholar lecture), and "Problems of Great Plains Agriculture Caused by Resource Price Deflation." University of Missouri Department of Agricultural Economics Paper 1978-16.

Request above papers from author.

BREIMYER, HAROLD F. "Statement at Hearing on Family Farms, Rural Development, and Special Studies Subcommittee of the U.S. House Committee on Agriculture." University of Missouri Department of Agricultural Economics paper 1978-20.

Request above report from author.

CORNMAN, JOHN M., and J. PATRICK MADDEN. *The Essential Process for a Successful Rural Strategy--A Policy Statement*. National Rural Center, December 7, 1977, 42 pp.

Request above report from Madden, Department of Agricultural Economics, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, Pennsylvania 16802.

DUNLOP, NELSON, GOLDBERG, FEDOR, BROWN AND VAUGHN. *The Lessons of Wage and Price Controls--The Food Sector*.

Request this book from publisher, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. (There is a charge.)

HANRAHAN, CHARLES E., and RICHARD N. KENNEDY. "Emerging Issues in Agricultural Trade and Development." *Looking Forward: Research Issues Facing Agricultural and Rural America*. ERS,USDA, September 1977.

Request a copy of the above article from Information Division, ESCS,USDA, 500 12th Street S.W., Washington, D.C. 20250.

HEADY, EARL O. *Econometric Simulation of the U.S. Farm Sector and Its Policies and Exports*. Center for Agricultural and Rural Development, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa 50010.

Request publication from author at above address.

HIEMSTRA, STEPHEN J., and JOHN BRADEN. *Food Program Evaluation Status Reports, Completed Studies*. FNS,USDA.

Request from authors of paper, Food and Nutrition Service, USDA, Washington, D.C. 20250.

HIEMSTRA, STEPHEN J. "Impact of USDA Food Programs on Agriculture." June 1978.

Request above speech from author, Food and Nutrition Service, USDA, Washington, D.C. 20250

HILLMAN, JIMMYE S. "Food--The Ultimate Weapon?" *Inter Economics*, January-February 1978, pp. 24-28.

Request above article from author, Head, Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona 85721.

MAYER, LEO. *Evaluation of Proposals Guaranteeing Full Parity for Farmers in the Marketplace*. Committee Print, House Agriculture.

Request above report from James A. Culver, House Agriculture Committee, 1301 Longworth House Office Building, Washington, D.C. 20515.

MEISTER, ANTON D., CARL CHEN, and EARL O. HEADY. *Quadratic Programming Models Applied to Agricultural Prices*. Iowa State University Press, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa, 50010. (Price \$6.95)

Request above publication from Earl O. Heady, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa 50010.

MILLER, ROBERT H. "Transfer of Flue-cured Tobacco Allotments." May 16, 1978.

Request above speech from author, CED,ESCS,USDA, Room 200, 500 12th Street S.W., Washington, D.C. 20250.

PRINDLE, ALLEN M. "Highlights of the Food and Agriculture Act of 1977." *Maryland Agri-Economics*.

Request above report from author, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Symons Hall, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland 20742.

RAY, DARYLL E. "U.S. National Agricultural Projection and Policy Models." November 1977.

Request above report from author, Department of Agricultural Economics, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma 74074.

SALATHE, LARRY and RUEBEN C. BUSE. *Household Food Consumption Patterns in the U.S. 1965*. USDA ESCS Technical Bulletin, forthcoming.

Request from Larry Salathe, NEAD,ESCS,USDA, Room 260, 500 12th Street S.W., Washington, D.C. 20250.

SCHMIDT, STEPHEN C., and HAROLD O. CARTER. *National and International Food Policies and Options that Impact on World Trade and Aid*, International Institute for Applied System Analysis. Research report RM-78-22, April 1978, 97 pp.

Request above monograph from author, 305 Mumford Hall, Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois 61801.

SEITZ, W. D. and R. G. F. SPITZE. "Soil Erosion Control Policies: Institutional Alternatives and Costs," *Journal of Soil and Water Conservation*, Vol. 33, Number 3, May-June 1978, pp. 118-125.

Request above articles from R. G. F. Spitze, 305 Mumford Hall, Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois 61801.

SPITZE, R. G. F. and R. A. HINTON. "Summary and Interpretations of Food and Agricultural Act of 1977 and Crop Production and Marketing Plans for 1978." Illinois Agricultural Economics Staff Paper 77 E-28, December 1977.

Request above paper from R. G. F. Spitze, 305 Mumford Hall, Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois 61801.

SUN, THERESA Y. *Forecasting Retail Values for the Market Basket of Farm Foods*. USDA ESCS Technical Bulletin 1578, September 1977.

Request from ESCS Publications, USDA, Room 0054, South Building, Washington, D.C. 20250.

TIMMER, D. PETER. "The Impact of Price Policy on Protein-Calorie Intake in Developing Countries."

Request above paper from author, Harvard School of Public Health, 665 Huntington Avenue, Boston, Massachusetts 02115.

TONTZ, ROBERT L. "U.S. Agricultural Exports: Short Term Trends." *Foreign Agricultural Trade of the U.S.*, April 1978.

Request above reprint from author, FDCD, ESCS, USDA, Room 378, 500 12th Street S.W., Washington, D.C. 20250

TROCK, WARREN L. "Agricultural Trade with the European Economic Community." Spring 1978. Request above speech from author, Department of Economics, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, Colorado 80523.

VOCHE, GARY, EARL O. HEADY, WILLIAM BOGGESE, and HAROLD STOCKDALE. *Economic Impacts on U.S. Agriculture from Insecticide, Fertilizer, Soil Loss and Animal Waste Regulatory Policies*. CARD Report No. 73, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development, Iowa State University.

Request above monograph from Earl O. Heady, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa 50010.

WARLEY, T. K. "Improving Access to the North American Market for Oceanic Agricultural Exports," *Proceedings of Conference on World Agricultural Trade*, held at Massey University, New Zealand, sponsored by Trade Policy Research Center (London), Massey University, and Kellogg Rural Adjustment Center, University of New England, Australia.

Request copy of proceedings from Warren Musgrave, Director, KRAU, Armidale, NSW, Australia.

WARLEY, T. K. "What Chance for Agriculture in the Tokyo Round?" in *The World Economy*, Vol. 1, No. 2, January 1978, and "Domestic Implications of the International Food Policy Agenda," in *Proceedings of the Symposium on Food and Trade and Aid*, University of Manitoba.

Request the above articles from author, School of Agricultural Economics and Extension Education, University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario, CANADA N1G 2W1.

WEAVER, ROBERT D. "Measurement of Allocative Biases of Production Control Policies." and "Acreage Response under Changing Control Policies." Spring 1978.

Request above papers from author, Department of Agricultural Economics, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, Pennsylvania 16802.